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Abstract
This paper will analyze the impact of the modernized approach to Article 102 
TFEU on the application of the prohibition of dominant position abuse contained 
in Polish competition law. For that purpose, several questions will be answered. 
Has the consumer-welfare standard already become, or will it become (in particular 
under the influence of the effects-based approach), the decisive criteria for the 
finding of a violation of Article 9 of the Polish Competition Act as well as its past 
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equivalents? Will EU’s new approach to the abuse of dominance lead to a re-
orientation of the goals pursued by Polish competition law on unilateral conduct? 
Has Polish enforcement practice attached as much emphasis to the protection 
of market structures as some EU cases that might have justified the accusation 
of over-enforcement? Has the recent reform introduced any new requirements, 
standards or tests in the procedural dimension of the application of the ban on the 
abuse of dominance and if so, to what an extent will they influence the traditional 
approach employed by Polish antitrust and judiciary institutions? 
In order to answer these questions, relevant Polish legislation and case-law will be 
analyzed. The article will try to establish the actual scope of the change relating to 
substantive as well as procedural rules which will (or should) affect the enforcement of 
Article 9 of the Polish Competition Act under the impact of the new EU approach. 
Résumé
Cet article a pour but d’analyser l’impact de l’interprétation modernisée de l’article 
102 TFUE sur l’application de l’interdiction de l’abus de position dominante dans la 
loi polonaise. Dans ce but, nombreuses questions seront adressées. Par exemple, le 
bien être des consommateurs, est-il déjà, ou sera-t-il dans le future (en particulier, 
sous l’influence de l’approche fondée sur les effets), le critère décisif pour constater 
une violation de l’article 9 du Droit de la concurrence polonais, aussi que leurs 
équivalents? 
La législation polonaise et la jurisprudence seront analysées. Cet article tente d’établir 
l’étendue actuel des changements relatifs aux règles substantives et procédurales, 
qui affectent (ou devraient affecter) le renforcement de l’article 9 du Droit de la 
concurrence polonais sous l’influence de la nouvelle approche de l’UE.
Classifications and key words: abuse of a dominant position; effects-based approach; 
consumer harm; exclusionary conduct; anticompetitive foreclosure; rule of reason; 
efficiency-defense; over-enforcement; ‘as efficient competitor’ test; standard of proof.
I. Introduction 
A new Guidance on exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings was 
published by the European Commission on 9 February 2009 in all languages of 
the EU Member States1. The Guidance specified the Commission’s modernized 
approach to the application of the prohibition of dominant position abuse 
1 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, OJ [2009] C 45/02, hereafter, Guidance.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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contained in Article 102 TFEU; particular issues2 concerning this reform will 
be discussed further in this paper.
The principles of the application of the Polish prohibition of dominant 
position abuse laid down in Article 9 of the Competition Act3 cannot remain 
unaffected by this reform. First, this provision is designed to fulfil a very similar 
(if not identical, see below) ultimate goal to Article 102 TFEU. Second, there 
are only a few substantially insignificant differences in the wording of those 
two legal rules4. Third, what speaks in favour of the interpretation of the Polish 
prohibition in line with the new Guidance is not only Poland’s membership in 
the EU but also, potentially even more importantly, the ‘membership’ of the 
UOKiK President in the European Competition Network. Finally, Article 102 
TFEU is directly applicable in all Member States and so the Polish antitrust 
authority, national courts5 and private entities are entitled to apply this 
provision directly in relation to dominant firms in Poland.
II.    ‘Consumer harm’ as the ultimate objective of the modernised 
approach to the ban on the abuse of dominance: 
the lack of reorientation? 
According to the underlying concept of the reform, the prohibition of 
the abuse of a dominant position is designed to protect consumers. More 
2 For a more detailed analysis of major issues underlying this reform and the solutions 
adopted in the Guidance, see e.q.: E. Rousseva, Rethinking Exclusionary Abuses in EU 
Competition Law, Oxford, Portland, Oregon 2010, p. 353–430; N. Petit, ‘From Formalism to 
Effects? The Commission’s communication on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 
82 EC’ (2009) World Competition 32(4) 483–497; D. Ridyard, ‘The Commission’s article 82 
guidelines: some reflections on the economic issues’ (2009) 30(5) European Competition Law 
Review 45–51; M. Kellerbauer, ‘The Commission’s new enforcement priorities in applying art. 82 
EC to dominant companies’ exclusionary conduct: a shift towards a more economic approach?’ 
(2010) 31(5) European Competition Law Review 175–186.
3  Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection (Journal of Laws 2007 
No. 50, item 337, as amended; hereafter, Competition Act).
4  T. Skoczny, ‘W sprawie modernizacji stosowania zakazu nadużycia pozycji dominującej’ 
[in:] C. Banasiński (ed.) Ochrona konkurencji i konsumentów Polsce i Unii Europejskiej, 
Bydgoszcz 2005, p. 107. The Author rightly notes that the prohibitions (emerging from 
the aforementioned provisions) should not be applied on the basis of different rules and 
concludes that also the ‘Polish’ ban on the abuse of dominance should be the subject of 
modernisation. 
5 See Article 5 and 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 
[2003] L 1/1; see also K. Kohutek, ‘Stosowanie reguł wspólnotowego prawa konkurencji przez 
sądy krajowe’ (2006) 8 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 13–21.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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significantly, consumer harm has become a decisive factor for an intervention 
by the Commission in unilateral conduct6 (see below, point III) – it relates to 
harm of economic nature that takes the form of higher prices, lower quality 
of goods and the limitation of offer and innovation7. In this context, the 
notion of ‘consumers’ is interpreted in economic terms reflected by all market 
participants operating on the demand-side8 (i.e. not only final consumers, but 
also intermediate producers, distributors and other users of the products or 
services9).
The legal instruments (including the ban on the abuse of dominance) 
contained in all three modern Polish competition laws10, were aimed at 
the protection of consumer interests or, at the very least, their protection 
constituted one of their main goals. Article 1 of the current Competition Act 
(similarly to the Act of 2000 and the preamble of the Act of 1990) explicitly 
speaks of the ‘protection of consumer interests’. It is worth noting however, 
that public protection of consumers was not necessarily commonly attributed 
to the prohibition of the abuse of dominance11, in particular after rules on 
collective consumer interests were added to the Act of 2000 (see Article 24 
– 28 of Competition Act). In order to determine whether that ban has indeed 
been applied as a means of preventing consumer harm, it is thus necessary to 
analyze Polish jurisprudence and, to a certain extent, also the administrative 
practice of the UOKiK President. Such an assessment leads to the conclusion 
that even before the formal endorsement of the recent reform, Polish courts 
have quite often passed judgments in which consumer harm constituted at 
least one of the criteria, if not even one of the decisive factors considered 
6  See point 5- 6 of the Guidance.
7  See point 6 of the Guidance.
8  The notion of consumer is broadly (economically) interpreted also under Polish antitrust 
rules; see D. Miąsik, T. Skoczny [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa 
o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 56, 57, 935.
9  See note No. 15 of te Guidance. 
10 The Act of 24 February 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices and Consumer 
Protection (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 1997 No. 49, item 318 as amended; hereafter, 
the Act of 1990); the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection 
(consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2005 No. 244, item 2080, as amended; hereafter, the Act 
of 2000) and of course the current Competition Act. 
11  Still, the explicit statement in the very wording of the act that its provisions are aimed at 
the public protection of the interests of consumers justifies the finding that the Competition 
Act is already (i.e. without necessity of amending its regulations) ‘formally prepared’ to pursue 
the ultimate aim of the modernized EU approach. Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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within the antitrust assessment of unilateral conduct12. This fact is confirmed 
by both older13 and more recent14 rulings.
However, other rulings lack the assessment of the impact of the scrutinized 
conduct on the economic situation of consumers. At the same time, they 
presented both conclusions: one, that despite the lack of such an analysis did 
not raise meaningful or substantial objections (because of no false positives15 
or no false negatives16) and another that could be seen as, at least, debatable17. 
Finally, it is possible to identify some Polish judgments where the protection 
of consumer interests was deemed to be of secondary importance, realized 
12 See also D. Miąsik, ‘Controlled Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study 
of the Goals of Polish Antitrust Law’ (2008) 1(1) YARS 49-51.
13 See for example the judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 April 1995, XVII 
Amr 67/94, Lex 56343, where the court required the consideration of the consumer interests 
(participants of the insurance market) by examining whether, and if so, how they benefited 
from sending them to car repairers that cooperated with the dominant insurer; judgment of 
the Antimonopoly Court of 17 June 2002, XVII Ama 98/01, UOKiK Official Journal 2002 No. 
3-4, item 173, where the court ordered the consideration (also) of the interests of passengers 
representing the demand-side of the market and their harm in the form of depriving them from 
the right to choose a contracting party.
14 See for example judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 
29 June 2007, XVII Ama 14/06, UOKiK Official Journal 2007 No. 4, item 45 (imposition of 
limitations in access to ski-slopes/lifts operated by the dominant firm on those who rented ski 
equipment from its competitors by requiring them to pay an additional fee); see also judgement 
of the Supreme Court of 19 October 2006, III SK 15/06, (2007) 21-22 OSNP, item 337 (infringing 
consumer interests by making it impossible to undertake the activity at stake by practically all 
potential competitors); judgement of the Supreme Court of 14 January 2009, III SK 24/08, 
not yet reported (excluding or limiting the possibility of offering more attractive conditions of 
rendering of liquid rubbish collection services).
15  For example the rightful qualification of the non-compete obligations as anticompetitive 
(judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 October 1994, XVII Amr 16/94, (1995) 4 
Wokanda). 
16 For example the correct acquittal of the use of uniform prices in the wholesale petrol 
market (judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 February 2002, I CKN 1041/99, (2002) 9 
Wokanda) or rightful acquittal of the refusal to appoint the profession location of lawyer at 
place, which that lawyer had indicated in his motion (judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 
May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, (2002) 1 OSNC, item 13). 
17 See for example judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09 (not 
yet reported) where selective above-cost price cutting in the market of sport newspapers has 
been found to be anticompetitive (risk of false positive). Fortunately that risk was here only 
theoretical, as the Supreme Court quashed the condemning ruling of the Court of Appeals 
on other grounds; see K. Kohutek, ‘Shall selective, above-cost price cutting in the newspaper 
market be qualified as anticompetitive exclusion? Case comment to the judgement of the 
Supreme Court of 19 August 2009 - Marquard Media Polska (Ref. No. III SK 5/09)’ (2010) 
3(3), p. 294.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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merely ‘by the way’ of the protection of the main aim of the Competition Act 
– ‘an atmosphere in which economic activity is conducted’18.
The protection of consumers from economic harm was thus one of the main 
goals (sometimes even the ultimate aim) realized by the Polish prohibition 
of the abuse of dominance. This realization is confirmed by doctrine which, 
while characterized by a certain ‘chaos’ in relation to the identification of the 
goals of Polish competition law, has nevertheless reached the conclusion that 
consumer-welfare is to be treated as its ultimate aim19. The implementation of 
the paradigms of the EU reform is unlikely therefore to lead to a functional 
re-orientation of the enforcement of Article 9 of the Competition Act as far 
as the determination of the goals of the Polish ban is concerned. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court stressed nearly a decade ago, during an investigation of a 
potential breach of that prohibition, that the Antimonopoly Act is not aimed 
at the protection of an individual undertaking but rather, that it protects 
competition as an institutional phenomenon20. Such statement21 is fully in line 
with the Commission’s declaration concerning its new enforcement priorities 
for Article 102 TFEU in relation to exclusionary abuses. The Commission 
found that ‘what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process 
and not simply protecting competitors’22. The spirit of recent UOKiK decisions 
is based on a similar approach23.
Aside from some recent rulings24, it would be difficult to find any Polish 
judgments that would resemble some of the well-known but controversial 
rulings based on the former Article 82 TEC, which have raised criticism 
because of their protectionism of competitors rather than the process of 
18  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, 
XVII Ama, UOKiK Official Journal 2006 No. 1, item 16.
19 D.  Miąsik, ‘Controlled Chaos...’, p. 55-56; see also K. Kohutek, [in:] K. Kohutek, M. Sie-
radzka, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2008, p. 341–342.
20 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, (2002) 1 OSNC, item 
13 where the court found that since the scrutinised practice of the dominant firm concerns an 
individual interest of the undertaking (here: a lawyer), than the provisions of the Antimonopoly 
Act are not applicable. Individual rights can be protected before civil or administrative 
courts.
21 The courts and the UOKiK President have subsequently often refered to the quoted 
statements of the Supreme Court as an appopriate interpretation of the aims of the Antimonopoly 
Act and the values protected by its rules.
22  See point 6 of the Guidance.
23  See decision of the UOKiK President of 24 August 2009, RBG-9/2009 stating that the rules 
laid down in the Antimonopoly Act (including the ban on abuse) are aimed at the protection of 
the mechanism of competition safeguarding the highest possible level of consumer welfare.
24  See in particular the judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, not 
yet reported; see K. Kohutek, ‘Shall selective…’, p. 294.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
IMPACT OF THE NEW APPROACH TO ARTICLE 102 TFEU…  99
competition25. Unlike EU law however, Polish antitrust was never concerned 
with the so-called ‘integration’ goal realized in Europe primarily by the 
elimination of trade barriers between Member States. The pursuance of this 
objective, including the ‘active’ enforcement of the abuse prohibition, has 
contributed greatly to the creation of a very structure/form-based approach to 
its application26 facilitating an elevation of the ‘integration’ aim over that of 
‘competition’. In light of the recent reform, the former has already given way, 
or at least will do so in the near future, to the fundamental aim of community 
competition rules27, that is, enhancing consumer welfare. 
III.    General approach to exclusionary conduct: between the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ definition
The protection of consumers is thus meant to be a major aim of the 
modernized approach to Article 102 TFEU. The ‘essence’ of that reform 
manifests itself in establishing the ‘consumer harm’ criteria as a direct pre-
requisite of an intervention by the Commission against unilateral conduct (see, 
below). The prevention of consumer harm has been the ultimate, general aim 
of the ban on the abuse of dominance also under the traditional ‘forms-based’ 
approach. It finds its support in a famous statement of the Court of Justice in 
Continental Can28, the first judgment examining a suspected infringement of 
that prohibition. The court stated there that this provision (originally Article 
86) is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers 
directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through their impact 
on effective competition29.
It seems legitimate to conclude therefore that the key change introduced by 
the recent reform is not reflected in the establishment of new paradigms for 
Article 102 TFEU30. Instead, it manifests itself primarily in the modification 
of the methods of examining whether a dominant firm’s conduct is harmful 
25  See in particular: T-203/01: Michelin v Commission, ECR [2003] II-5917; C-95/04 P British 
Airways plc. v Commission ECR [2007] I-2331; C-202/07 France Télécom S.A. v Commission (not 
yet reported); see also E. Fox, ‘We Protect Competitioon, You Protect Competitors’ (2003) 
26(2) World Competition 149–165.
26 And thus to increase, at least potentially, the number of decisions that could constitute 
false positives. 
27  A fact noticed by Polish doctrine; see T. Skoczny, ‘W sprawie modernizacji...’, p. 112–114.
28 6/72 Europemballage/Continental Can v Commission ECR [1973] 215. 
29  Para. 26 of the Continental Can. 
30 Literature contains opposite findings also; see for example T. Eilmansberger, ‘Neue 
Paradigmen im Europäischen Recht?’ (2009) 4 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 438.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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to consumers and thus prohibited whereby the term ‘methods’ is understood 
as procedural measures as well as modifications in substantial soft-law. The 
latter refers in particular to changes in the general concept of exclusionary 
abuse31. In light of the Guidance, exclusionary abuse should be associated 
with anticompetitive foreclosure leading to consumer harm32. The reformed 
approach to exclusionary conduct has thus a narrower scope than the ‘definition’ 
developed in Continental Can and Hoffman La-Roche. A negative impact on the 
structure of competition and a presumed only harm to consumers (‘indirect’) 
are no longer sufficient. Under the new effects-based approach, not only is it 
necessary to demonstrate harm to the structure of competition (foreclosure) 
but also that such foreclosure is the cause of consumer harm33. 
The analysis of relevant jurisprudence (see, point II) clearly suggests that 
the Polish prohibition of the abuse of dominance is already being used as 
a means of protection against (at least) indirect34 consumer harm. The key 
question here is whether the ban on exclusionary abuse has also in Poland 
already become (or will do so in the future) a legislative instrument designed 
to prevent only direct (actual or likely) consumer harm or, in other words, 
will consumer harm act as a direct operational criteria of differentiating 
anticompetitive practices from legal conduct of dominant entities.
It would be difficult to answer that question in the affirmative and even 
more so, to deliver an unambiguously positive answer. First, even though 
Polish jurisprudence has quite often treated consumer interests as an 
important factor in antitrust assessments of unilateral conduct, consumer harm 
itself was usually ‘only’ inferred35. Moreover, general substantial framework 
of exclusionary conduct constructed in recent case law36 does not relate to 
31  Exploitative practices of dominant companies have not been encompassed by the reform 
(see, point V).
32 According to the Commission (point 19 of the Guidance) ‘anticompetitive foreclosure 
describes a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or 
markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of a dominant undertaking 
whereby the latter is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment 
of consumers’; whereby the notion of ‘price increase’ is also used for other (than price) ways 
in which the parameters of competition (such as output, innovation, the variety or quality of 
goods/services) can be influenced (point 11 of the Guidance).
33  See also e.g. N. Petit, ‘From Formalism...’, p. 486. 
34 What relatively often meant in EU case-law the presumed/alleged harm only or simply 
harm that is just potentially possible (see in particular cases: Michelin II, British Airways, 
Wanadoo).
35 And thus becoming similar to ‘indirect consumer harm’ within the meaning of the 
Continental Can.
36  The Polish Competition Act, similarly to ‘hard’ Community law, does not provide for the 
definition of abuse determining only the notion of a dominant position (see Article 4 point 10 
of the Competition Act). Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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consumer harm. In the opinion of the Supreme Court: ‘anticompetitive abuse 
of a dominant position constitutes such a conduct of a dominant undertaking 
that while being objectively contrary to normal competition, may influence the 
structure developed by community courts’ (see Hoffmann La-Roche case37). 
That concept was strongly influenced by ordo-liberal thoughts, based on the so 
called ‘formal/structured-based approach’ to the abuse of dominance. It over 
relies on such values and goals as: striving for the integrity of the common 
market, economic freedom and fairness38. Many of those postulates have been 
revised under the effects-based approach, a fact reflected at least to some 
extend by the new Guidance. The Polish concept of exclusionary conduct, even 
though presenting some intellectual progress in comparison to the Hoffman 
La-Roche formula (see below), is neither close to the wording nor even to 
the essence of anticompetitive foreclosure (within the meaning presented by 
the Commission). Its content makes no reference to consumer harm, it also 
ignores the fact that the basic intervention condition in exclusionary conduct 
can give raise to the risk of condemning practices that in fact do not/are 
not likely to harm consumers, being harmful only to the competitor’s of the 
dominant firm at most39 (risk of false positives). Downplaying the consumer-
harm-condition can be all the more meaningful considering that the Supreme 
Court created that concept in a judgment passed more than half a year after 
the EU reform40. As far as the scope of the general approach to exclusionary 
conduct is concerned, it can be assumed therefore that Polish judiciary has not 
yet fully accepted its substantial, modernized framework. Taking into account 
37 85/76  Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461; see para. 91 of that 
judgment where the Court ruled that: ‘the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating 
to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the 
degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition 
still existing in the market or the growth of that competition’.
38 For a detailed presentation of the ordo-liberal school (Freiburg school), see e.g. 
D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometeus, Oxford 
2001, p. 271-333; see also, Ch.A. Ahlborn, A.J. Padilla, ‘From Fairness to Welfare. Implications 
for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competitioon Law’ [in:] C-D. Ehlermann, 
M. Marquis (eds.) European Competition Law Annual 2007. A Reformed Approach to Article 82 
EC, Hart Publishing, Portland 2008, p. 64-69. 
39  What also occurred in that case (see judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009. 
III SK 5/09). It can be inferred from its content that ‘harming a competitor’ of the defendant 
constituted in fact the main criterion of considering his price-based conduct as anticompetitive 
(see also K. Kohutek, ‘Shall selective...’, p. 294.
40  The Guidance was issued in December 2008 (in English); its translations were published 
on 9 February 2009. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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the non-binding character of the Guidance, this in itself does not constitute 
a violation of EU law. The approach of the Supreme Court proves that it has 
taken a reserved stance towards EU trends41 and remained, at least to some 
extent42, ‘loyal’ to more traditional concepts (shaped by community courts and 
not by the Commission43). For the time being however, it would be unjustified 
to conclude on the basis of a single judgment only that the general concept of 
exclusionary conduct has already been fully developed and commonly accepted 
in Poland44. Such a finding is strongly dependant on the ‘will’ and ‘frequency’ 
of recalling that concept in future judgments45 and decisions of the UOKiK 
President.
IV.    Procedural requirements and mechanisms under the ‘effects-based’ 
approach
1.  Tendency to increase the standard of proof
It is likely that the most ‘practically appreciable’ change caused by the 
EU reform will be reflected by an increase46 of procedural requirements for 
demonstrating whether a dominant firm’s conduct is anticompetitive. The 
Commission, national authorities and any others claiming that a violation of 
the ban on abusive conduct took place will have to prove not just an inferred 
41 ‘Formalised’ primarily by the executive authority of the Commission in the form of 
appropriate soft law documents. 
42 The presented concept departs somewhat from Hoffman La Roche. For example, it 
rightfully does not speak of weakening of competition (allegedly caused by the mere fact of 
the very presence of the dominant undertaking on the given market). There is no direct relation 
between market concentration and the restriction of competition on that market; see also 
W. Kolasky, ‘What is competition? A comparison of U.S. and European perspectives’ (2004) 
Spring-Summer The Antitrust Bulletin 32, 33.
43  The Commission itself explicitly declares that the Guidance is not intended to constitute 
a legal statement and is without prejudice to the interpretation of Article 82 by the ECJ or 
CFI (point 2 of the Guidance).
44 The judgment of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09, contains however the first as extensive 
declaration on the Supreme Court’s general approach to exclusionary conduct. 
45  However in one of its latest rulings, the Supreme Court referred to the presented judgment 
(see footnote above) and especially to the ‘disproportionality condition’, i.e. an element of the 
general concept of exclusionary abuse (developed in the latter); see judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 18 February 2010, SK 28/09 (not yet reported) where the reduction of prices (for 
international calls) has not been qualified as disproportionate (on the market affected by the 
conduct of a dominant undertaking).
46  See also N. Petit, ‘From Formalism...’, p. 497.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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but an actual47 or likely48 consumer harm – it will thus not be sufficient to 
demonstrate an indirect49 or potentially possible harm only. So far, Polish 
abuse cases did not normally include a detailed assessment of the influence 
of the conduct on the economic situation of consumers50 (indicating51 that 
the practice under scrutiny actually harmed or will likely harm consumers). 
Establishing a violation of the said prohibition was limited to the evaluation 
of the legal conditions of a given practice (usually listed in the Competition 
Act52), without analyzing its market effects (a fact noted by doctrine53). 
It appears that the need to meet an increased standards of proof will, or 
at least should constitute a significant change in the enforcement of Article 
9 of the Polish Competition Act. The fact should be stressed however that at 
least in some Polish cases both the likelihood and the form of consumer harm 
have been reliably inferred from ‘mere life experience’54 (i.e. without reference 
to a complex economic assessment or even any at all). With respect to other 
cases, and in particular ‘complicated’ ones, the assumption of such a presumed 
harm (or lack thereof) would be doubtful under the reformed methodology 
concerning the establishment of abuse. In such cases, proving or disproving 
consumer harm will often require the conduct of an analysis of the actual and 
future (long-term) market conditions on the scrutinized markets, including 
some hypothetical evaluations55.
47  See points 21, 37, 52 of the Guidance.
48  See points 20-22, 30, 31, 36, 50, 52, 63, 70, 71 of the Guidance.
49 I.e. the harm, inferred from the infringement of the market structure (competitors’ 
harm).
50  Leading to the creation of a coherent and reliable theory of consumer harm; see P. Lowe, 
‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century – The Experience of the 
European Commission and DG Competition’ (2008) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter.
51  On the basis of particular evidence (like: higher prices, limited output or choice, etc.).
52 The list of statutory abuses is longer in the Polish Competition Act than in Article 102 
TFEU, including seven (however also only exemplatory) forms of conduct that may constitute 
an abuse of dominance.
53  T. Skoczny, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsiki (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 614. 
54 See e.g. decision of the UOKiK President of 24 August 2009, RBG-9/2009, UOKiK 
Official Journal 2009 No. 4, item 31 where a violation of Article 9 of Competition Act was found 
by reference to ‘mere life experience’. The President indicated that the market entry of the 
dominant firm’s competitor would without a doubt lead to measurable benefits for customers 
(in particular in the form of cost reductions).
55 I.e. establishing the likely way in which the relevant market will development and in 
particular whether consumers would be better or worse off in the absence of the conduct 
in question (so called ‘an appropriate counterfactual’; see point 21 of the Guidance). Some 
elements of ‘counterfactual methodology’ can be found in an ‘older’ Polish rulings; see judgment 
of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 March 1995, XVII Amr 66/94 (1996) 3 Wokanda where the 
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Nonetheless, some recent judgments of the Supreme Court have placed 
greater emphasis on the performance of a more detailed market assessment 
in order to deliver economically reliable grounds speaking for, or against, the 
occurrence of consumer harm caused by the conduct under consideration. 
The court ruled in one of its judgments that the mere limitation of another 
company’s freedom to act (usually concerning the competitor of the dominant 
entity) is not sufficient to establish a violation of Article 9 of the Competition 
Act; such limitation must be capable of having actual or likely (but logically 
explained) impact on the level of competition on the market. Proof that the 
imposition of a contractual clause has raised the costs of the contracting 
parties of a dominant undertaking (compared to their costs borne in the 
absence of such clause) has also been recognized by the Court as a necessary 
condition to qualify such clause as anticompetitive56. In a subsequent case, 
the Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the Court of Appeals due to, among 
other things, the inability to demonstrate an allegedly negative impact of 
the dominant undertaking’s conduct on the economic conditions of a given 
market and thus also (i.a.) on prices of services rendered on that market57. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has treated a decision of the UOKiK President58 
as defective because it did not present the operational conditions of the Polish 
gas market in the relevant period of time (a crucial factor for the evaluation of 
the effects on competition and consequently also consumers of the practices 
of market participants59). The aforementioned judgments60 suggest that Polish 
jurisprudence is considering following the trend to increase the standard of 
proof required to establish a breach of the prohibition of dominant position 
abuse61.
One of the objectives of the reformed approach to the application of Article 
102 TFUE is increasing the transparency and predictability of its enforcement. 
than their absence, dismisses the endangering of the public interest brought about by those 
practices.
56  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 February 2009, III SK 31/08 (not yet reported); for 
a detailed analysis of this ruling see K. Kohutek, ‘Zarzut nadużycia pozycji dominującej na rynku 
usług weterynaryjnych. Glosa do wyroku SN z dnia 19 lutego 2009 r.’ (2009) 4 Glosa 93-109.
57  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 March 2010, III SK 37/09 (not yet reported), where 
the court explicitly stated that the UOKiK President, obliged to demonstrate a violation of 
competition rules, has not met the required standard of proof. 
58  Decision of the UOKiK President of 9 August 2005 (DOK-91/2005).
59  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 July 2009, III SK 34/08 (not yet reported).
60 Both repealing the verdicts of the Court of Appeals and sharing (at least partially) the 
arguments put forward by the defendant. 
61 Literature has treated the first of the judgment of 19 February 2009, III SK 31/08 as 
an example of the use of the economic approach by Polish judiciary, i.e. concentrating the 
assessment on the effects of the conduct in question; T. Skoczny, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, 
D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa..., p. 614.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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The fulfilment of this goal is better to be seen in the procedural dimension 
as well. It is because of creating legal instruments, tests, presumptions and 
defences which are designed to facilitate self assessment by dominant firms 
(ex ante) as well as assessment by those charging them with a violation of 
competition law to construct the presumption of the abuse. It pertains 
especially to solutions such as: dominance screen, the lack of per se abuses, 
‘as efficient’ competitor test or efficiency defence. 
2. The lack of per se abuse?
Under the new approach to Article 102 TFEU there shall be no per se 
abuses62 (the correct standpoint in particular in the dimension of substantial 
law63). In other words, no practices will be condemned solely on the basis of 
their form or intrinsic features. As opposed to hard-core cartels, unilateral 
practices quite frequently are of ‘dual nature’ – capable of having simultaneously 
anti- and pro-competitive effects.
Polish jurisprudence has generally not applied a formula of per se illegality to 
any specific forms of unilateral conduct, a fact not disproved by the realization 
that abuse charges were often evaluated by the examination of the fulfilment of 
statutory conditions of a given ‘named’ example of abuse64 (see above). Indeed, 
judgments can be identified where the courts ruled explicitly that some forms of 
conduct (potentially exclusionary or discriminatory) are not in themselves anti-
competitive (e.g.: exclusive dealing65, non-linear pricing for the rent of premises66, 
62 See R. Whish, Competition Law, Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press 2009, 
p. 196, 197.
63 The Commission reserved the right not to carry out a detailed assessment before 
concluding that the conduct in question is likely to result in consumer harm and thus is likely 
to be abusive (anticompetitive). Such ‘simplified methodology’ of finding abuse (or at least of 
adopting of the presumption of abuse) shall be limited to such conduct only that apparently can 
solely raise obstacles to competition and create no efficiencies (see point 22 of the Guidance); 
so called ‘opt-out clause’.
64  The majority of those cases pertained to exploitative practices (see Article 9 (2) point 1 and 
6 of Competition Act) which do not usually have exclusionary/anticompetitive effects; also those 
practices shall be ‘formally’ classified as anticompetitive; see K. Kohutek, ‘Naruszenie interesu 
publicznego a naruszenie konkurencji – rozważania na tle praktyk rynkowych dominantów’ 
2010 (7) Państwo i Prawo.
65 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 September 1992, ZO 500/92, (1993) 2 
Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 January 1997, XVII Amr 65/96, (1998) 
1 Wokanda.
66  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 13 March 2002, XVII Ama 23/01, Lex 56377.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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applying regressive rents for the lease of land or standings on the local fair67, 
network access refusal68, price discrimination69).
3. ‘As efficient competitor’ test: conceptually already applied 
One of the key rules associated with the effects-based approach assumes 
that in principle only competitors that are at least as efficient as dominant 
firms deserve (‘indirect’70) antitrust protection71. The so called ‘as efficient 
competitor’ test is an instrument designed to facilitate the legal qualification 
of a dominant firm’s price-based exclusionary conduct. 
Even before the formal introduction of the EU reform, some Polish 
judgments already referred at least to the very concept underlying this standard. 
In one of such verdicts, the Supreme Court stressed the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the dominant undertaking due to earlier economic expansion and 
concluded that the ineffectiveness of its competitors was caused by that very 
advantage72. In other cases, inefficient competitors did not gain antitrust 
protection73.
The approach adopted in these judgments was conceptually based on the 
assumptions underlying the ‘as efficient competitor’ standard. They did not 
however apply the methodology of that test which requires the comparison 
67 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 January 1998, XVII Ama 59/97, Lex 
56167.
68  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 July, 2009 III SK 34/08 (not yet reported), where 
the court found as incorrect the treatment as abusive of each refusal of the rendering of 
transmission services of imported gas (that took place before 1 May 2004).
69 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III SK 5/09 (not yet reported), in 
which the court indicated that price-differentiating is per se not anticompetitive even when 
carried out by a dominant undertaking.
70 Under the reform, the prohibition is not ‘in itself’ designed to protect competitors of 
dominant undertakings (see point 5 and 6 of the Guidance). The ultimate goal of its enforcement 
is to prevent consumer harm whereby its pursuance can ‘by the way/indirectly’ also protect some 
categories of competitors of dominant companies.
71  See point 23 of the Guidance. 
72 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 February 2002, I CKN 1041/99, (2002) 9 
Wokanda.
73 See for example judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 January 2002, I CKN 112/99, 
(2002) 4 Biuletyn Sądowy where the court associated competition with an instrument of 
improving efficiencies pointing out that the elimination of ineffective undertaking constitutes 
the essence of (market) rivalry; see also Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 17 June 2002, 
XVII Ama 98/01, UOKiK Official Journal 2002 No, 3-4, item 173, where the court indicated 
that the essence of competition equals a situation where those who as the result of market 
rivalry lost their contracting parties, will be forced out of the market, frequently experiencing 
financial losses. Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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of prices of goods/services offered by the dominant entity with the costs of 
their production74 (whereby, as a matter of principle75, a conduct shall not be 
condemned if the prices are above a certain level of costs76). However, some 
recent decisions of the UOKiK President concerning price-based practices 
of a dominant undertaking77 already include a price-cost analysis78 based on 
appropriate evidence79. Reference to the price-cost methodology has also been 
made in the latest judgments of the Supreme Court which stated that as long as 
price-cutting does not result in a reduction of prices below the costs incurred 
by the defendant, than such practice cannot be seen as anticompetitive80.
4.    Efficiency defence: the application of the rule of reason to the abuse of 
dominance
The Commission has explicitly permitted the invocation of the objective 
justification defence or efficiency defence by dominant firms under the reformed 
approach to Article 102 TFEU 81. It is the ‘efficiency-institution’ that matters 
most in the light of the basic assumptions underlying the reform. A dominant 
entity is entitled to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive foreclosure by 
demonstrating that in the affected markets the likely efficiencies brought 
about by its conduct outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare82.
Polish antitrust provisions (in line with Article 102 TFEU) do not stipulate 
any formal exceptions (‘exemptions’) from the prohibition of abuse. Still, 
some both recent and past judgments can be identified where the practices of 
74  Point 25 of the Guidance.
75 In certain circumstances the Commission has however reserved the possibility of 
interfering in the pricing policy of dominant companies also where a less efficient competitor 
exerts competitive pressure (see point 24 Guidance).
76  See points 26 – 27 of the Guidance.
77  Predatory pricing in particular. 
78 Probably under the influence of the reform and its methodology of price-based 
exclusionary conduct evaluation.
79 See e.q. decision of the UOKiK President of 26 August 2009, RBG-411-10/06/BD; 
decision of the UOKiK President of 30 April 2009, RLU-411-02/06/MW, decision of the UOKiK 
President of 31 March 2009, RKR-4/2009.
80 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2010, III SK 28/09 (not yet reported). 
The Supreme Court ruled however in an earlier judgment that prices can be treated as unfair 
also when they are set above costs; see judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 August 2009, III 
SK 5/09 (not yet reported).
81  See points 28-30 of the Guidance.
82  See point 30 of the Guidance where the Commission determined the conditions of the use 
of the efficiency-defense; they are similar to the pre-requisites laid down in Article 101(3) TFUE. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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dominant firm that ‘looked abusive’ prima facie were not condemned because of 
circumstances constituting their objective justification (sensu largo). Moreover, 
the first modern Polish Antimonopoly Act of 1990 contained an explicit legal 
basis to ‘legalize’ the conduct of a dominant undertaking that would otherwise 
be seen as a monopolistic practice (Article 6 of the Act of 199083). This 
provision became the basis for the establishment of the rule of reason84 in 
Polish antitrust. Among market practices of dominant companies that have 
escaped condemnation are: the conclusion of agreements with specific car 
repairers only85; rendering an exclusive right to sell or buy goods on a specified 
territory86; collecting fees for telecoms services that were not included in the 
price list and were subsequently counted among telephone fees87.
The formal framework established in the Act of 1990 has thus, paradoxically, 
corresponded better to the new EU standards than the provisions contained in 
later Polish legislation. Article 6 of the Act of 1990 effectively provided a legal 
basis for an ‘exemption’ from the ban on the abuse of dominance in cases where 
such an exemption was economically justified88. The court had rightly stressed 
in that context that ‘the indispensability of the monopolistic practice’ (within 
the meaning of that provision) shall be examined not only from the perspective 
of certain facts but also from the point of view of economic insights89. 
Subsequent legislation did not contain an ‘equivalent’ rule. Its absence should 
explain the lack of cases in the last decade where the practices of a dominant firm 
83  The wording of that provision has been cited in footnote no. 89.
84 See for example judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 June 1999, I CKN 43/98, (1999) 
12 OSNC 216; see also D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku w prawie antymonopolowym, Zakamycze 
2004, p. 374-413. 
85  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 April 1995, XVII Amr 67/94, Lex 56343. In 
this judgment the court ruled that the Antimonopoly Office should have examined whether likely 
benefits resulting from the practice (prima facie abusive) outweigh the expected restrictions of 
competition.
86 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 January 1997, XVII Amr 65/96, (1998) 1 
Wokanda, where it was said that the scrutinized practices can be legalized (on the basis of 
Article 6 of the Act), if they (i.a.) safeguard proper benefits to consumers. 
87 Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 January 1995, XVII Amr 51/94, (1995) 12 
Wokanda. The examined practice had not been qualified as abusive because it contributed to 
development of national telecoms which in turn helps satisfy the social needs of the society in 
a more efficient way.
88  That provision provided, that the abuse of dominance prohibition shall not apply, when 
the practices of the dominant undertaking were technically or economically indispensable for 
conducting an economic activity and did not lead to a significant restriction of competition. 
The burden of demonstrating such circumstances lies with the person who invoked them. It is 
thus not only the concept but also the procedure and the conditions that are similar to those 
established by the Commission in points 28-30 of the recent Guidance. 
89 Judgement of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 January 1995, XVII Amr 51/94, 12 (1995) 
Wokanda.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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that had some anticompetitive effects were not qualified as abusive on the basis 
of a ‘pure’ efficiency defence or, in other words, because of the use of the rule of 
reason under Article 9 of the Competition Act. Such a legislative environment 
does not of course hinder, or indeed eliminate, the permissibility of the use of 
an efficiency defence also under current provisions. The conditions sets out in 
the recent Guidance could serve here as a point of reference for the UOKiK 
President, Polish courts and dominant undertakings. Existing case-law (see above) 
and the interpretation of the pre-requisites of Article 6 of the Act of 1990 could 
also be helpful, at least to some extent, to the implementation of the efficiency 
defence under the effects-based approach associated with the application of the 
prohibition laid down in Article 9 of the current Competition Act.
V.    Exploitative practices: of no antitrust concern 
under the new approach?
The recent reform is relevant to only one category of unilateral conduct 
– exclusionary practices90. The Commission stressed that the number of future 
interventions against such conduct will decrease significantly (‘last resort inter-
vention’91). However, exploitative practices (primarily the imposition of exces-
sive prices or other onerous contractual conditions) constituted the subject 
matter of the majority of Polish abuse cases92 due to the specific structure of 
many Polish markets (most often local) affected by the conduct of dominant 
undertakings. In many cases, dominant undertakings were natural/‘network’93 or 
legal monopolies, which used to be the case in relation to territorial self-govern-
ment units or other entities that by order of those units organized or rendered94 
90  The most frequently investigated by the Commission type of unilateral practices. 
91 See point 7 Guidance where the Commission declares that it will intervene rather 
exceptionally in such cases, i.e. in particular where the protection of consumers and the proper 
functioning of the internal market could be otherwise not adequately ensured. The Commissioner 
for Competition Policy N. Kroes noted also that ‘fairness played a prominent role in the 
enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in a way that is no longer the case’, concluded that 
a similar development could take place in Europe; N. Kroes, ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Policy 
Review of Article 82’, speech delivered at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, 23rd 
September 2005 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2005.html.
92  It concerns mainly the period of time between 1990-2005.
93  A significant part of the cases concerning exploitative abuses refered just to undertakings 
of such category. 
94 Under the Competition Act, the status of ‘an undertaking’ is attributed also to those 
organising or rendering public utility services which are not business activity (see Article 4 
point 1a of the Competition Act); see also G. Materna, Pojęcie przedsiębiorcy w polskim i 
europejskim prawie ochrony konkurencji, Warszawa 2009, p. 90-103. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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public utility services95. Still, some ideas underlying the reform are already 
reflected96 in a number of recent Polish judgments concerning the interpreta-
tion of the provisions on exploitative practices. 
A reduction in interventions directed at exploitative practices97 is to be 
expected in the future also in relation to the activities of the UOKiK President. 
Not only is such trend already practically underway98 finding support in the 
latest rulings of the Supreme Court99, it is confirmed by the official motto 
placed on the UOKiK’s website100 which indicates that the authority’s focus on 
exclusionary conduct. The words ‘You have a choice’ suggest that the President 
of UOKiK is intending to concentrate primarily on preventing and combating 
exclusionary practices that result in the limitation of choice101. 
VI. Final remarks 
The following conclusions can be reached on the basis of an analysis 
concerning the question to what an extent has the EU reform already affected 
or is likely to affect the substantial framework and enforcement procedure of 
Article 9 of the Polish Competition Act in the future. 
 95  The statute gives the commune the exclusive right to render, and in particular to organise 
such services; see Article 7 of the Act of 8 March 1990 on the self-government of communes 
(consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2001 No. 142, item 1591, as amended).
 96 See for example judgement of the Supreme Court of 19 February 2009, III SK 31/08 
(not yet reported) where the court ruled that the onerosity of the terms and conditions of an 
agreement (see Article 9(2)(6) of the Competition Act) shall be evaluated from both legal and 
economic perspective. 
 97  Perhaps under the influence of the new approach of the Commission.
 98 See in particular the decisions of the UOKiK President issued in 2009 and 2010. Their 
majority refers to exclusionary practices. In the opinion of the UOKiK President, dominant 
undertakings have usually violated Article 9(2)(5) of the Competition Act (‘counteracting the 
formation of conditions necessary for the emergence or development of competition’).
 99 See the judgement of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2010, III SK 24/09 (not yet 
reported). In the opinion of the court, the imposition of excessive prices should in free market 
economy be found only exceptionally, and in particular, in relation to practices of those 
operating as network monopolists.
100 According to this slogan: ‘You have a choice. We’ve been taken care of that for 20 years’. 
These words have been placed on the UOKiK’s website on the occasion of the 20th anniversary 
of its creation (see: www.uokk.gov.pl and www.20lat.uokik.gov.pl). 
101 It should be assumed that the notion of ‘choice’ is to be interpreted broadly implying 
also a rather broad scope of what practices restrict choice. It thus shall concern not only those 
that result in limiting market options or hampering innovation but also those that lead to higher 
prices (such prices – at least indirectly – limit the actual choice for consumers).Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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First, the reform should not lead to any revolutionary changes in the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Competition Act in its axiological dimension, 
i.e., as far as the establishment of the ultimate purpose of the prohibition of 
the abuse of dominance. The economic interests of consumers are already 
frequently treated as the ultimate aim of this legal provision. Quite a number 
of Polish judgments have referred to the main ideas underlying the new 
effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU. In the future however, an even 
stronger emphasis on the protection of consumer interests is to be anticipated, 
in particular, by attributing to it a sort of ‘exclusivity’ among all the other 
values protected by Article 9 of the Competition Act.
Second, in relation to the scope of the general substantial concept of 
exclusionary abuse, it is doubtful whether the basic change (the establishment 
of an explicit reference to consumer harm) has been deeply considered in 
the Polish jurisprudence. For the time being, it seems too early to make such 
far-reaching conclusions. The UOKiK President, or others claiming that a 
violation of Article 9 of the Competition Act took place, shall be required 
to conduct an appropriate market analysis of the contested anticompetitive 
practice whereby a credible consumer harm (not only potentially possible) acts 
as a decisive condition of finding at least the presumption of the violation of 
that provision. 
Third, it cannot be assumed that some of the specific instruments 
encompassed by the EU reform (e.g. the lack of per se abuse; the permissibility 
of a ‘legalization’ of prima facie anticompetitive practices by reference to 
objective/economic justification; the application of the ‘as efficient competitor’ 
test) constitute a complete novelty for the application of the Polish equivalents 
to Article 102 TFEU. Referring to the latter operational rule, even though the 
methodology underlying that test has not been used in former Polish cases, a 
price-cost analysis of the dominant firm’s goods and services has been already 
incorporated into some recent decisions of the UOKiK President. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that as opposed to the wording of Article 
102 TFEU, the Polish Competition Act contains a legal rule designed to 
reduce the scope of the interventions by the competition authority – the 
general condition that the act applies only to situations where the scrutinized 
conduct goes against the public interest102 (see Article 1(1) of the Competition 
Act). A correct interpretation of the ‘public interest-clause’ provides a formal 
basis of selecting only those practices of a dominant firm that truly justify the 
intervention by the UOKiK President103 (reducing the risk of false positives). 
102 Literature defines the requirement of public interest violation as an ‘intervention 
pre-requisite’; see D. Miąsik, T. Skoczny, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), 
Ustawa..., p. 60.
103  See also D. Miąsik, ‘Controlled Chaos...’, p. 42-43. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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This clause prevents also the misuse of the Competition Act (including its 
ban on abuse) by preventing its enforcement merely to protect the interests 
of those entities ‘jeopardized’ by the intense competition from a dominant 
company104. Such competition is generally favourable to consumers, both in 
the short- and the long-run.
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